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CRIMINAL LAW: WHO WILL DECIDE WHEN
A PATIENT MAY DIE?
Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.1980)
Suffering from a terminal illness, Abe Perlmutter, a competent seventythree year old hospital patient, attempted to remove the respirator sustaining
his life.' Although his family supported his decision, the Florida Medical
Center prevented Perlmutter from disconnecting the life-support system.2 The
patient then petitioned the circuit court for an order restraining the hospital
from continuing his life-sustaining treatment.3 The circuit judge issued the
restraining order in recognition of Perlmutter's constitutional right of privacy.Affirming the circuit court order, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled
that a competent patient5 has a constitutional right of privacy to refuse lifeprolonging treatment after the prognosis of an agonizing terminal illness.6 On
certiorari, 7 the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the opinion of the district
1. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978). Mr. Perlmutter was
afflicted with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, commonly known as "Lou Gehrig's disease." The
normal life expectancy for a patient with this disease is two years. Mr. Perlmutter's doctors
did not expect him to live more than a few hours if the respirator was removed. During
the sixteen months of the progression of this case through the courts he remained alive
but unable to move, and able to communicate only on a limited basis. Id.
2. Id. Mr. Perlmutter had attempted to remove the respirator, but an alarm notified
the hospital staff who quickly reconnected the apparatus. He had repeatedly requested that
his family disconnect the respirator. Id.
3. Perlmutter v. Florida Medical Center, 47 Fla. Supp. 190 (Broward County Cir. Ct.
1978).
4. The trial court decision read in part: "[Ijt is ordered and adjudged that Abe Perlmutter,
in exercise of his right of privacy, may remain in defendant hospital or leave said hospital,
free of the mechanical respirator now attached to his body and all defendants and their
staffs are restrained from interfering with plaintiff's decision." Id. at 194.
5. The court stressed that Mr. Perlmutter "remains in command of his mental faculties
and legally competent." 362 So. 2d at 161. The standard by which the court determined
that Mr. Perlmutter was competent was not expressly established, though the court's decision
clearly depended on a finding of competency. Id. at 162.
In cases involving the determination of the competency of a testator, the Supreme Court
of Florida has set forth definite standards of competency. "A court should not set aside a will,
deed, or other agreement for mere mental weakness if it does not amount to inability to
comprehend the effect and nature of the transaction and is unaccompanied by evidence of
imposition of undue influence." Gardiner v. Goertner, 110 Fla. 377, 384, 149 So. 186, 189
(1933). Apparently applying a similar standard, the court found that Mr. Perlmutter had
sufficient mental ability to comprehend the inevitable result of his choice, and that the
decision was the result of his own volition. 362 So. 2d at 161.
6. Id. at 164. "It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so that
there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and no possible trespass
on medical ethics. However... [s]uch a course of conduct invades the patient's constitutional
right of privacy, removes his freedom of choice and invades his right to self-determine." Id.
7. Despite a concurring opinion urging that the case be certified to the supreme court,
the District Court of Appeal refused because it desired to put the Perlmutter decision into
effect immediaetly. 362 So. 2d at 164. The state filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The
supreme court took jurisdiction pursuant to FLA. CONsT. art. V, §3(b)(3), relying on the fact
that the lower court decision directly affected the rights and duties of state attorneys, who
form a class of constitutional officers. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
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court,3 limited its decision to this particular fact situation, 9 and HELD, the
state's interest in the preservation of life and maintaining the ethical integrity
of the medical profession did not outweigh the right of the individual to
refuse medical treatment."0
The right of an individual to refuse medical care has traditionally been
protected by the common law doctrine of informed consent" which prohibits
doctors from treating patients without authorization. Even in its earliest
acknowledgment of the right of the individual to control his physical integrity,
however, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the state may
place limits on this personal right.' 2 As patients have claimed a right of privacy,
8. 379 So. 2d 359. Although the decision of the supreme court concentrated primarily
on jurisdictional issues, the court expressly adopted the entire analysis of the District Court
of Appeal, bestowing the authority of the supreme court on that opinion. Writing for the
court, Justice Sundberg stated: Because of the clarity of reasoning and articulation of the
applicable principles of law contained therein, little could be added by our reformulation
of the matters set forth in the opinion below. Accordingly, we adopt the opinion of the
district court as our own with the caveat that the reach of this decision does not extend
beyond the particular facts presented in the case before us. Id. at 360.
9. Id. Even though the district court opinion expressly limited its decision to the specific
facts of the instant case, the supreme court reiterated this limitation. See note 8 supra.
10. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
11. The common law in every state prohibits doctors from administering medical treatment without informed consent. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent
Dying Patients, 30 RuTGErs L. REv. 243, 248 (1976). See, e.g., Scholendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits assault); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup.
Ct.1962) (doctors may not administer blood transfusions to non-consenting adult).
The doctrine of informed consent establishes a dual responsibility for physicians: 1) a
duty to disclose to the patient the nature and ramifications of available treatments, and 2)
a duty to obtain the patient's consent to any treatment prior to its administration. Recent
judicial decisions have established the responsibility of a physician to adequately inform his
patient of treatment alternatives as an integral protection of the informed consent doctrine.
See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d
170, 181 (1957); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 407, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103-04 (1960). The
duty to obtain a patient's consent to treatment has been protected in the common law
since Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767). See generally Meisel, The
"Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing
Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wisc. L. REv. 413 (1979); Meisel, The Expansion of
Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed
Consent, 56 NEm. L. REv. 51 (1977); Roth & Wild, When the Patient Refuses Treatment:
Some Observations and Proposals for Handling the Difficult Case, 23 ST. Louis UNIv. L. J.
429 (1979).
The doctor's duty to obtain the consent of the patient before commencing treatment
establishes the right of the patient to determine whether or not he will submit to any of the
possible treatments. This portion of the informed consent doctrine is tantamount to a
right of privacy to refuse medical care.
The court apparently assumed that the physician's duty to inform the patient of treatment alternatives had been met. The court noted that Mr. Perlmutter was fully aware of
the ramifications of his decision to disconnect the respirator. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving
decision at the Fourth District Court of Appeal). Consequently, the only facet of the informed consent doctrine which remained to be considered was the patient's right to refuse
treatment. The court chose to treat this issue, not under the doctrine of informed consent,
but as a constitutional right of privacy. Id. See note 8 supra.
12. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). "No right is held more sacred,
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courts have consistently balanced this interest against the state's interest in
protecting the health, safety, and morals of the community. 13
In the absence of a decision from the United States Supreme Court defining
the patient's right to refuse treatment, lower courts have struggled to weigh the
competing interests of the state and the individual. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in In re President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc.,14 decided that a number of governmental interests
overcame both a patient's right of privacy and her right to exercise her
religious beliefs. 15 In Georgetown, the hospital sought a court order authorizing
blood transfusions necessary to save the life of a young mother. 16 After the
district court denied the request, 7 the circuit court enumerated several factors
which favored forcing the patient to receive medical treatment. Under the
doctrine of parens patriae, the government had an interest in preserving the
life of the mother for the sake of her infant child.' Similarly, the government
should protect the patient, whose weakened physical condition diminished her
mental capacity to decide on necessary treatment. 9 A third factor was the
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint of interferences of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id.
13. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (state permitted to sterilize incompetents);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state could require small-pox vaccination);
Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (courts may order compulsory medical treatment of children), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
14. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
15. Id. Patients have often demanded a right to refuse medical treatment based on
the first amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Many of these
cases have involved the Jehovah's Witnesses' refusal of blood transfusions as a mandate of
their religious faith. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965)
(court refused to authorize blood transfusion for nonconsenting Jehovah's Witness). These
cases have precedential value for the instant case because the governmental interests which
are balanced against the right to religious freedom are applicable when weighing a patient's
constitutional right of privacy.
16. 331 F.2d at 1001-02. The patient, a twenty-five year old mother of a seven-month-old
child, had lost two-thirds of her blood supply from a ruptured ulcer. Because of her religious
beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness, the patient and her husband refused to consent to blood transfusions which doctors believed were essential to prevent her death. Id. at 1006.
17. Id. at 1002 n.4.
18. Id. at 1008. Courts have invoked the common law parens patriae doctrine to protect
the governmental interest in preserving the health of minors and incompetents. Thus, if the
death of a patient would threaten the well-being of children, the parens patriae doctrine
authorizes the court to prevent the patient's death for the sake of these third parties. See
United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (court ordered necessary blood
transfusions for father of four minors); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson,
42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (court ordered blood transfusion for pregnant woman), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 985 (1964).
The parens patriae interest also empowers the state to protect the health of mentally
incompetent citizens. In situations in which a patient has been adjudged incompetent, this
state interest has predominated over the patient's right to reject treatment, permitting
courts to order medical care. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text, infra. In these different
contexts, the parens patriae doctrine authorizes court action to protect the health of both
third parties and incompetent patients.
19. 331 F.2d at 1008. Although the patient was able to communicate that she would
not authorize the transfusion, the circuit court judge stated that she was obviously not in a
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government's interest in assisting the medical profession to fulfill its responsibility to a patient who had committed herself to the care of the
hospital.2° Finally, the fact that the patient would die if the court did not
sanction treatment against her will persuaded the court to decide that the
21
state's interest was dominant.
The right to privacy has subordinated governmental interests in other
areas of the law. In Roe v. Wade2 2 the United States Supreme Court balanced
compelling governmental interests against a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy. Acknowledging constitutional protection for a fundamental right
of privacy, 23 Roe established that state criminal abortion laws may not abridge
a woman's right to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.2 4
The Court expanded the right of privacy beyond the traditional areas of
marriage, 25 contraception, 26 and education,2 7 by upholding the right of the
mental condition of making the decision. The court decided it had a duty to assume the
responsibility of guardianship for her. Id. Accord, Nathan & Miriam Barnert Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n v. Young, 63 N.J. 578, 311 A.2d 1 (1972) (guardian appointed to consent to amputation);
In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360 (Ch. 1977) (court appointed guardian to
consent to amputation when elderly patient could not comprehend that surgery was necessary
to save her life). But see Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. 1978) (refusal of a
necessary operation is not presumptive evidence of incompetence); In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d
616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (court refused to sanction amputation for elderly
woman who could not comprehend that the operation was necessary).
20. 331 F.2d at 1009. The circuit court judge held that the patient did not have the
right to limit the doctor's ability to effectively treat a patient who had committed herself
to his care. Id.
21. Id. at 1009-10. The inevitability of death without government imposed treatment has
not always triumphed over the patient's right to refuse medical care. Compare John F.
Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (preserving the life of
the patient was a compelling state interest sufficient to defeat the patient's right to refuse
blood transfusions) and Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215,
267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (court decided it could not let the patient die) with In re
Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (patient's right to refuse blood transfusions could be
exercised even if death was the inevitable result) and In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390
N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (court refused to authorize necessary transfusion when it was
against competent patient's will).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. Although the Constitution does not expressly mention a right of privacy, the Supreme
Court has recognized that there is constitutional protection for certain areas or zones of
privacy. Id. at 152. The Court has attributed this guarantee to the first amendment, Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); or to the liberty protected by the fourteenth
amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
24. The Roe Court thus applied the right of privacy to a new context, criminal abortion
laws. The court held that a woman has a qualified, fundamental right to choose whether
to terminate her pregnancy. This right can be limited only by compelling state interests.
410 U.S. at 154. The court found no state interests sufficient to outweigh the right of
privacy during the first three months of pregnancy. Id.
25. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry without racial restrictions).
26. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to
obtain contraceptives).
27. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to choose education
for children).
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patient to make medical decisions without interference by the state. 28
Armed with this expanded view of the privacy right, legislatures in several
states have sought to establish standards for the right to refuse necessary medical
treatment. 29 The California legislature, for example, passed the Natural Death
Act in 1976.30 This statute authorized competent adults to sign a standardized
directives l which instructs their physicians to withhold life-sustaining treatment if they are diagnosed as terminally ill.32 Moreover, the statute abolished

criminal and civil liability for doctors who withhold treatment in accordance
with the patient's decision.

3
3

28. 410 U.S. at 153. "The right of privacy .. . is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
Although the right of privacy has been primarily applied to areas involving marriage
and the family, Roe indicates that other "zones" of privacy exist. In upholding the right
of a woman to decide to have an abortion, the Supreme Court did not determine the
boundaries of the privacy right. Thus, it has been argued that the right of a patient to
refuse medical treatment is another area to which the constitutional right of privacy should
apply. For a discussion of the evolution of the constitutional right of privacy and its present
definition see Comment, Roe v. Wade and In re Quinlan: Individual Decision and the Scope
of Privacy's Constitutional Guarantee, 12 U.S. F. L. REv. 111 (1977). See generally J. SHAT-rucK,
RIGHTs OF PRIVACY

122-26 (1977).

29. Natural death legislation has been considered in twenty-seven states. Note, The
California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. R.v.
913, 917 n.20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as An Empirical Study]. In Florida alone, a dozen
proposed statutes have been considered, though none has been passed. 362 So. 2d at 164.
Seven states, in addition to California, have enacted natural death laws: AR. STAT. ANN.
§§82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE §§39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REv.

§449.540-.690 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§24-7-I to -11 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§90-320
to -322 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§97.050-.090 (1977); TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN.
STAT.

tit. 4590h, §§1-11 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
30. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§7185-95 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-80). California was
the first state to pass a natural death act. See An Empirical Study, supra note 29, at 917.
Three states which have enacted similar statutes have used the California act as a model.
Id. at 917 n.20.
31. The directive reads in part:
"I. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified to be a
terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures
would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of my death and where my physician
determines that my death is imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized,
I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die
naturally.
"6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and mentally
competent to make this directive."
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7188 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-80).
32. The phrase "terminal condition" does not have a definite meaning. Although a
majority of doctors accept the definition of "an illness that progresses to death regardless
of what is done," more than 40% of doctors surveyed in California indicated that the
meaning of "terminal condition" varies with each patient and illness. An Empirical Study,
supra note 29, at 932.
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7190 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-80). In many cases, the
doctor's decision regarding treatment still supersedes the patient's right. If the patient fails
to re-execute the directive after the diagnosis of terminal illness, the doctor considers the
patient's choice to die as only one factor in the doctor's decision regarding treatment. Id.
§7191(c).
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In states without an applicable statute, the courts have arrived at varying
standards for compelling medical treatment, reflecting differing conceptions of
the right of privacy.34 The New Jersey supreme court decided in In re
Quinlans5 that no compelling state interest could force Karen Quinlan to
have her life prolonged by a mechanical respirator.36 The court ruled that the
right of privacy included a patient's decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment
under those facts. 37 Establishing the limits of the patient's right, the court
noted that the state's interest weakens and the privacy right is enhanced when
an increasing risk of bodily invasion exists with a minimal likelihood of recovery-8 If there is no reasonable hope of the patient returning to cognitive,
sapient life,39 the patient's decision to refuse treatment must be honored.40
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not limited the right of
privacy to patients lacking cognitive life. In Superintendent of Belchertown V.

Saikewicz,41 a state mental institution sought authorization to give chemotherapy treatments to a profoundly mentally retarded victim of leukemia.42
For a discussion of the extent to which the Natural Death Act facilitates the patient's

exercise of the right of privacy, see An Empirical Study, supra note 29; Comment, The Right
to Die a Natural Death: A Discussion of In Re Quinlan and the California Natural Death
Act, 46 U. CIN. L. Rav. 192 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Die].
34. Judicial decisions concerning the right to refuse medical care have not been consistently based on a right of privacy. The instant case, as well as cases from other jurisdictions,
however, equated the patient's right to refuse treatment with the right of privacy. 362 So. 2d
at 164.
35. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 657, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
36. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. Karen Ann Quinlan, twenty-two years old, was in a coma'
with only the vegetative functions of her brain operating. The trial court refused to allow
removal of the respirator, noting that withholding treatment from a patient who did not
meet the criteria of "brain death" would violate current medical standards. In re Quinlan,
137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. 1975).
37. 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. See Coburn, In re Quinlan: A Practical Overview, 31
ARK. L. REv. 59, 69 (1977). For a discussion of the patient's right to decline necessary
medical treatment and the possibilities of criminal liability, see Collester, Death, Dying and the
Law: A ProsecutorialView of the Quinlan Case, 30 RuTrroms L. Rav. 304 (1976).
38. 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Cf. In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d
785 (1978) (amputation of both legs was "extensive bodily invasion" making the right of
privacy paramount to the state's interest). This standard leaves a great deal of discretion
to the courts. See generally Cantor, supra note 11; Hirsch & Donovan, The Right to Die:
Medico-Legal Implications of In re Quinlan, 30 RuTGms L. REV. 267 (1976).
39. The testimony of expert witnesses convinced the court that there was no realistic
possibility of Karen resuming cognitive life. 70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655. A cognitive state
requires awareness of the patient's surroundings and the ability to make some mental
judgments. Similarly, Dr. Fred Plum testified that the human brain functions in two capacities:
vegetative and sapient. The vegetative functions of Karen's brain were still working,
controlling and regulating body temperature, blood pressure, sleeping and waking. Because
her brain was operating at this reflex level, it was not biologically dead. However, Karen's
brain did not function at the sapient level which is characteristic of the human brain.
According to Dr. Plum, sapient life includes the capacity to talk, see, feel, think, and sing.
Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654-55.
40. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672.
41. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
42. Mr. Saikewicz was sixty-seven years old, with a mental age of two years and eight
months. He was diagnosed as having acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia, an incurable
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The court recognized a substantive right of both competent and incompetent
patients to refuse life-prolonging treatment. 43 This right was not viewed as
absolute, however, and might be limited by the interests of the state. 44 Four
government interests were noted as relevant to the patient's right to refuse
treatment. First, the court identified state interests in preserving life 45 and
in preventing suicide. 46 In addition, the court recognized state interests in
protecting dependent third parties who would suffer from the patient's
48
death 47 and in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.
The instant case relied heavily on the standards announced in Saikewicz,
as the Supreme Court of Florida considered for the first time a patient's right
to refuse life-sustaining medical care. 49 In a unanimous decision, 50 the Florida
supreme court adopted the appellate court's analysis in its entirety, s 1 affirming
the preeminence of the patient's right of privacy over legitimate state interests.
The court interpreted the constitutional right of privacy as protecting the
right of a patient to reject extraordinary medical treatment 52 when the evidence
and terminal disease. Id. at 420. Belchertown State School, a state mental institution.
petitioned the Probate Court of Hampshire County for appointment of a guardian to
make decisions concerning his treatment. The guardian ad litem decided that chemotherapy,
which would cause pain and discomfort, should not be administered to prolong the patient's
life. Id. at 419.
43. Id. at 424, 427. See generally Comment, Constitutional Law - Right of PrivacyQualified Right to Refuse Medical Treatment May Be Asserted for Incompetent Under
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 27 EMORY L.J. 425 (1978).
44. 370 N.E.2d at 424.
45. Id. at 425-27. The court decided that the state's interest in the preservation of life
was lessened by a diagnosis of a terminal disease. Then the court rejected the idea that
the state might have a greater interest in protecting the life of a competent patient than
the life of an incompetent patient. Finally, the court equated this state interest with the
protection of the sanctity of life, which was ill-served by any decision that did not recognize
an individual right of self-determination. Id.
46. Id. at 426. The court reasoned that the state's interest in preventing suicide was not
applicable in this case because Mr. Saikewicz had no specific intent to die and because his
affliction was not self-induced. Id. at 426 n.1 1.
47. Id. at 427. Because Mr. Saikewicz had no dependents, the court held that the state's
interest in protecting third parties was not a factor in this decision. Id. at 426.
48. Id. The court decided that rejecting chemotherapy was consistent with prevailing
medical ethics. As evidence of the current ethical standards of the medical profession, the
court quoted Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally Ill, 206 J.A.M.A. 387
(1968), "[We should not use extraordinary means of prolonging life or its semblance when . ..
there is no hope for the recovery of the patient. Recovery should not be defined simply as
the ability to remain alive; it should mean life without intolerable suffering." 370 N.E.2d at
424.
49. 379 So. 2d at 360 (Fla. 1980) (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, 362 So. 2d at 162). See note 8 supra.
50. Justice Adkins concurred in the result only. 379 So. 2d at 361.
51. Id. See note 8 supra.
52. The Quinlan court recognized a distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
medical treatment, noting that the respirator was an extraordinary measure for dying, as
opposed to curable, patients. 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 668. However, the definition of
"extraordinary treatment" remains unclear. See Hirsch & Donovan, supra note 38, at 28991. A frequently cited definition of "extraordinary means" is "all medicines, treatments, and
operations which cannot be obtained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other in-
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overwhelmingly indicates unbearable pain and imminent death.5 3
Following the Saikewicz rationale, the court first balanced Perlmutter's
right of privacy against the state's interest in preserving life. 54 Emphasizing
the diagnosis of a terminal illness and the patient's excruciating suffering, the
court held that the state had no compelling interest in forcing treatment. 55
The court then concluded that the patient's decision to reject life-prolonging
treatment did not threaten the state's interest in preventing suicide.5 6 Accepting
Perlmutter's testimony that he wanted to live, and noting that he had not
caused the affliction which would lead to his death, the court refused to
5
equate the passive act of declining treatment with homicide. 7
The instant court found that the two remaining state interests contemplated
in Saikewicz were also subordinate to Perlmutter's right of privacy. The court
indicated that if the patient's death were tantamount to abandoning a minor
child for whose care the patient was responsible, the state would have a strong
parens patriae interest in compelling life-sustaining treatment. 58 However,
since all the members of Perlmutter's immediate family were legally competent,
the court found no third party potentially burdening the state's resources for
proper care.5 9 Finally, the court considered the state's interest in protecting
the ethical integrity of the medical profession and noted that prevailing
medical ethics do not require the prolongation of life in all circumstances. 6o
convenience, or if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit." Kelly, The Duty to
Preserve Life, 12 THEOL. SvurtEs 550 (1951). It has also been suggested that extraordinary
treatment is any measure which can have no further "curative effect." Ramsey, Prolonged
Dying: Not Medically Indicated, HASTINS CENTER REP., Feb. 1976, at 14.
53. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
362 So. 2d at 162, 164). See note 8 supra. The standard of "imminent death" is essential to an
interpretation of the California Natural Death Act. But the definition of "imminent death"
is uncertain. Though some doctors considered the standard met if death would certainly
occur within a week, others defined "imminent" as death within twenty-four hours. See An
Empirical Study, supra note 29, at 933.
54. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 362
So. 2d at 162). See note 8 supra.
55. Id. The supreme court adopted the analysis in Saikewicz: "[Tjhere is a substantial
distinction in the State's insistence that human life be saved where the affliction is curable,
as opposed to the state interest where, as here, the issue is not whether, but when, for how
long and at what cost to the individual his life may be briefly extended." 370 N.E.2d at 42526. Clearly the cost to Perlmutter was great; the court viewed the respirator as "inflicting
never ending physical torture .
" 8.
362 So. 2d at 164. See note 8 supra.
56. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
362 So. 2d at 162-63). The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that Perlmutter's desire to
live and the fact that he had not caused his physical condition "precludes his further refusal
of treatment being classed as attempted suicide." Id. See note 8 supra.
57. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 362
So. 2d at 163). Although Mr. Perlmutter sought permission to effect an affirmative act of disconnecting the respirator, the court found this analogous to a cancer patient who decides
to refuse surgery -clearly a passive act. Id.
58. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
362 So. 2d at 162). The Fourth District Court of Appeal cited the Georgetown decision as
an example of a factual situation in which the state's parens patriae interest surmounted
the patient's right to refuse treatment. Id.
59.

Id.

60. Id. at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 360 So. 2d
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The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the court maintained, is consistent
with current medical ethics which emphasize the need to comfort, rather
than treat, dying patients. 6 Thus, no relevant state interest was sufficient to
defeat Perlmutter's right of privacy.62

While establishing standards for balancing the patient's right of privacy
against the state's interests, the Supreme Court of Florida specifically limited its
decision to the facts of the instant case. 63 The court predicted, however, that a
comprehensive solution to the right-to-die issue would have to encompass a
multitude of fact situations.64 Therefore, the court insisted that the patient's
right to refuse treatment was a question best solved by the legislature. 5 The
factors on which the court based its decision should provide guidelines for
the statutory solution sought by the court.
The court's language suggested that a legislative definition of the patient's
right to refuse treatment should reflect the state's interest in the preservation
of life.66 By concluding that imminent death and prolonged suffering weaken
this state interest, the court established a limit on the state's ability to compel
the preservation of life.6 7 Although the court indicated that the diagnosis of a
terminal illness lessens this state interest, the effect of other factors such as an
absence of cognitive life remained unclear. 68 The court did not decide whether
at 163-64). Citing Saikewicz, the court claimed that allowing Mr. Perlmutter to die would
not violate current medical ethical standards. Accordingly, the court discounted the weight
of the state's interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical practice and of
aiding all members of the medical profession in fulfilling their responsibilities to Mr.
Perlmutter. Id.
61. "Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that all
efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather, as indicated in Quinlan,
the prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are more often in
need of comfort than treatment." Id. See note 79 infra.
62. "It is our conclusion, therefore, under the facts before us, that when these several
public policy interests are weighed against the rights of Mr. Perlmutter, the latter must and
should prevail." 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal, 362 So. 2d at 164).
63. 379 So. 2d at 360. See note 9 supra.
64. Id. at 361. The court indicated that the State had urged the judiciary to abstain
from deciding this case because of the dangerous precedent it would set for widely varying
circumstances and the intricate issues it involved. Because the constitutional rights of Mr.
Perlmutter were in jeopardy, however, the court refused to postpone the resolution of this
case. The court quoted Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n. v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684
(Fla. 1972): "[I]t is primarily the duty of the legislative body to provide the ways and
means of enforcing ... [constitutional] rights; however, in the absence of appropriate legislative action, it is the responsibility of the courts to do so." Id. at 686.
65. 379 So. 2d at 360. "It is the type issue which is more suitably addressed in the
legislative forum, where fact finding can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested
institutions and disciplines can be presented and synthesized. In this manner only can the
subject be dealt with comprehensively and the interests of all institutions and individuals
be properly accommodated." Id.
66. Id. The court recognized that the patient's right to refuse treatment involved the
interests of many parties, all of which should be considered in a legislative decision. The
four state interests enunciated by the court were clearly viewed as most urgently in need
of legal protection. See 362 So. 2d at 162,
67. 379 So. 2d at 360.
68. The Florida supreme court specifically confined its analysis to the case of a competent
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such other evidence would also define the scope of the state's interest in forcing
life-prolonging treatment.
This interest in preserving life parallels the state's concern with preventing
suicide. Because disconnecting the respirator would inevitably result in death
from natural causes, the instant court refused to equate Perlmutter's impending death with suicide. 9 In an isolated departure from the facts of this case,
the court, in dicta, proclaimed that there is no legal duty for the competent,
terminally ill to undergo surgery which would only temporarily prolong life. 70
Similarly, the court held the affirmative act of disconnecting the respirator prolonging Perlmutter's life was equivalent to a passive act of declining surgery.71
Stressing Perlmutter's testimony that he desired to live, the court indicated
that only intentional death invokes the state's interest in preventing suicide.72
Although concluding that Perlmutter's death did not constitute suicide, the
court neither defined suicide nor established whether the state has an absolute
patient, but mental disability has affected the state's interest in preserving life in other courts.
The Quinlan court held that the improbability of the patient returning to cognitive, sapient
life diminished the state's interest in preserving life. 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Another
factor, the degree of bodily invasion necessary to sustain life, further curtailed this state
interest in the Quinlan decision. Id. The court's consideration of these factors indicated that
the state's interest in preserving life may involve a judgment of the quality of the patient's
prospective life. The dangers of courts determining a patient's right by a "quality of life"
value judgment has been a criticism of the Quinlan decision. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 11,
at 265.
69. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
362 So. 2d at 163). The Saikewicz court used similar reasoning. 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.ll.
70. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
362 So. 2d at 163).
71. See id. Referring to the hypothetical situation in which a terminally ill patient
rejects surgery, the court reasoned that in both that situation and Mr. Perlmutter's case,
the patient was "choosing not to avail himself of one of the expensive marvels of modem
medical science." Id.
In another section of the opinion, the supreme court referred to the various situations in
which a patient might choose to refuse treatment as being the result of advances in medical
science. 379 So. 2d at 361. For a discussion of the rapidly evolving medical practices which
increase life-sustaining ability, see Belligie, Medical Technology As It Exists Today, 27
BAYLOR L. RaEv. 31 (1975). The moral decisions which determine when a patient may die,

however, have confronted all generations prior to present technology. "Whenever the duty
to relieve suffering has clashed with the value of life itself, the essential issues have been
the same as those we face today." T. ODEN, SHOuLD TREATMENT BE TERMINATED? XVi (1976).
72. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
362 So. 2d at 162-63). The court insinuated that the state's interest in preventing suicide
would prevail over the patient's right to reject treatment if the patient's primary intention
was to die. Thus, Mr. Permutter's desire to live was a factor weighing in favor of upholding
his right of privacy. This seems contrary to Georgetown, where the patient's expressed desire
to live influenced the court in its decision to force medical treatment. The court distinguished
Georgetown and similar cases from Mr. Perlmutter's situation, noting that the patients in
these prior decisions were either incompetent or equivocal in their expressed decisions. 379
So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 362 So. 2d at
163). Cf. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972) (court refused to order blood trans.
fusions for a Jehovah's Witness against his will while noting that he wanted to live). In
Saikewicz, the court decided that the absence of an intent to die made the state's interest

in preventing suicide inapplicable. See note 46 supra.
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duty to prevent it. A codification of the patient's right to refuse necessary
medical treatment may require that the legislature define suicide and establish
whether the state may force treatment whenever death would be tantamount to
suicide.
A legislative definition of the patient's right to refuse treatment should
reflect the state's parens patriaeinterest. The Florida court focused on the fact
that Perlmutter would not abandon any minor children by his death.7 3 The
court failed to clarify whether the existence of any financially dependent
parties would invoke the parens patriae interest. Although the Saikewicz
court dismissed the parens patriae interest by noting that the patient's death
would not affect any third parties, 74 this state concern has not previously
been limited to the protection of third parties. Both the Georgetown and
Quinlan courts recognized that the parens patriae responsibility included a
duty of the state to protect disabled patients, and in particular, incompetent
patients. 7 5 In contrast, the instant court refused to consider the effect of in-

competency on the state's interest, since that question was not at issue.76 It may
be appropriate for a statute to reflect the parens patriae interest with respect
to both third parties and incompetent patients.
A legislative treatment of the patient's right to refuse medical care must
also encompass the state's interest in protecting the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. In the past, states have asserted their interest in encouraging life-sustaining treatment by imposing civil and criminal liability on
doctors who allowed their patients to die.7 7 The instant court concluded, however, that medical ethics have undergone substantial changes so that deferral
to a patient's refusal of treatment is ethically proper in certain circumstances.78
73. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
74. 370 N.E.2d at 427.
75. Determining the best interests of the patient by professional medical testimony, the
Quinlan court interpreted the parens patriae interest as requiring the court to effectuate
treatment decisions for the incompetent patient. 70 N.J. at 44, 355 A.2d at 666. Thus, this
state interest may weigh in favor of the patient's right of privacy. If the patient cannot
competently declare his decision concerning treatment, and medical experts conclude that
a competent patient in this position would choose to refuse medical care, the court will
not sanction life-prolonging treatment. Id. The Georgetown court decided, however, that
life-prolonging treatment served the best interests of the patient. Thus, in Georgetown the
parens patriae interest dominated the expressed choice to refuse treatment when the patient
was judged incompetent to comprehend the consequences of her choice. 331 F.2d at 1008.
Similarly, the California Natural Death Act has no provision for enforcing a patient's right
to refuse treatment if the patient is not competent after the terminal illness has been
diagnosed. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7191(c) (West Cumin. Supp. 1979-80).
76. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
362 So. 2d at 162).
77. In the instant case, the State claimed that allowing Mr. Perlmutter to die would
be an unlawful killing of a human being under FLA. STAT. §782.04 (1979), or manslaughter
under FLA. STAT. §782.08 (1979). Very few cases have imposed liability on doctors for refusing
to administer treatment, however. See Collester, supra note 37, at 310-11. See also Hirsch &
Donovan, supra note 38, at 301.
78. 379 So. 2d at 360 (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
362 So. 2d at 163). Ethical guidelines for life and death decisions have recently received
much attention. Some commentators have suggested that physicians should have a set of
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As long as these circumstances remain undefined, physicians must decide
whether to respect their patients' right to refuse treatment while uncertain
of the legal ramifications. 9 While urging such legislative definition, the instant
court neither condoned nor condemned enactments such as the California
Natural Death Act. 0 The standardized directive"' may provide the Florida
legislature with an exemplary procedural device. However, the recent California statute has had questionable effectiveness in providing patients with a
mechanism to exercise their right of privacy6 2 Furthermore, the standardized
criteria to consistently determine whether there is a quality of life present which creates a

duty to sustain the life. H.

BRODY, ETHICAL DECISIONS IN MEDICINE

65 (1976). One proposed

system is a set of "positive human criteria;" if the patient does not meet any of these criteria,
then it is claimed that death is ethically permissible. Fletcher, Indications of Humanhood:
A Tentative Profile of Man, 2 HASTINGS CENTa REP. 1 (Nov. 1972). Arguably, Mr. Perlmuttdr
met each of the fifteen criteria under this system.
Another scholar on medical ethics has suggested that physicians must consider three distinctions in determining the duty to sustain life: 1) between "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
treatment, 2) between prolonging the living of life and prolonging a patient's dying, and 3)
between direct killing and merely allowing the patient to die. Ramsey, On (Only) Caring for
the Dying, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 189 (R. Weir ed. 1977). The distinction
between affirmative killing and passively allowing death, however, has been criticized as
arbitrary. See Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 THE NEw ENGLAND J. OF MED.
(1975).
The position of the American Medical Association was stated by its House of Delegates
on December 4, 1973: "The intentional termination of the life of one human being by
another-mercy killing-is contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association.
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong the life of the body
when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the decision of the
patient/or his immediate family. The advice and judgment of the physician should be freely
available to the patient and/or his immediate family." Id. at 78.
See generally E. KLUGE, THE PRAcricE OF DEATH 226-44 (1975); T. ODEN, supra note 72;
P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 268-335 (1978); J. WILSON, DEATH BY DECISION
167-95 (1975).
79. While weighing the moral and ethical considerations which are relevant to treatment
decisions, physicians must also consider their own potential liability. This burden dilutes
considerations of the patient's best interests. Comment, The Problem of Prolonged Death:
Who Should Decide?, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 169, 171 (1975).
The Supreme Court of Florida recognized that physicians, public officials, and hospitals
needed a definitive statement of the patient's right to refuse treatment as a guide for their
conduct. 379 So. 2d at 360. The court noted that fears of liability for treatment decisions
could not be discounted because of the absence of any Florida law on this subject. Id. (approving the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 362 So. 2d at 162).
80. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text, supra.
81. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
82. Some critics have noted that the California Natural Death Act is balanced in favor
of the doctor's rights. See The Right to Die, supra note 33, at 204. The only incentive for a
doctor to honor a patient's directive is the threat of a sanction for unprofessional conduct.
Id. If a patient fails to re-execute the directive after the diagnosis of a terminal illness, or
cannot re-execute because of incompetency, the directive is just one factor in the doctor's
decision concerning treatment. Id. at 198. Furthermore, a survey conducted thirteen months
after the enactment of the statute showed that many doctors were ignorant of the details
of the Act, and few were informing their patients of this option. See An Empirical Study,
supra note 29, at 931-38. The writer concluded, however, that "[t]he survey indicates that
the California Natural Death Act has partially achieved its goal of giving terminally ill
patients more control over their own treatment." Id. at 940.
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